In some cases, this safety mechanism can break down, though. Weather
forecasts can be wrong, in some cases the ‘significant weather’ charts miss
regions of bad weather while at other times they may show such large regions of
bad weather as to be too vague to be practicable. Ground and satellite-based
weather data can be out-of-date, particularly in the case of long-haul flights:
The weather information used by the flight planners may be 10 hours old by the
time an aircraft is close to its destination. Lastly, on-board weather radar
does not always detect adverse weather: Its efficacy relies upon the flight
crew correctly manipulating the radar settings to provide an optimum view of
the conditions ahead.
A common occurrence, particularly south of the European Alps, is for
an aircraft to encounter heavy turbulence without any warning. The crew using a
radar tilt setting that is too shallow, meaning that rapidly building
convection is not seen by radar until the aircraft is dangerously close to it,
often causes these surprise encounters. This has, in a number of cases, led to
crew and passenger injuries. For some regions, such as the Alps, the problem is
exacerbated by the congested airspace: Deviating to avoid bad weather may bring
an aircraft too close to other traffic. Managing the dual threat posed by
weather and traffic requires good communication and planning between ATC and
flight crews.
 |
The percentage of all flights (global), subdivided by
aircraft type that passed within 10km of a lightning strike. Measured during
March 2014 – May 2015. Courtesy of Dr Simon Proud, AOPP, University of Oxford.
|
A further problem is that, in some cases, convective storms can
produce broad, dense, clouds composed of very small ice crystals – too small to
be detected by radar. The crystals are, however, still capable of causing
difficulties for the unprepared flight crew. The chain of events that resulted
in the loss of Air France flight 447 began with airspeed sensors obstructed by
ice crystals. Several other flights have also suffered from unreliable airspeed
due to pitot tube obstruction whilst others have experienced engine
difficulties caused by ice crystals building up on internal surfaces. Radar,
therefore, cannot be relied upon to be a foolproof warning system for bad
weather – the skill of the flight crew in manipulating its settings and
interpreting the data it displays is vitally important.
Use of Airborne Radar by Aircrew
In flight, the only equipment pilots have at their disposal for
tactical weather avoidance are the on-board weather radar and the naked eye.
Radar use and interpretation is vital to flight safety. Every pilot studies the
use of weather radar as part of their CPL/MPL/ATPL course. However, as
technologies change, it is difficult for course syllabi to remain current.
Furthermore, flight simulators are often unable to replicate the weather radar
for training purposes. Consequently, pilots can be limited to the information
available in aircraft manuals, instruction during training or learning by
osmosis during line flying. Radars themselves are becoming more automated and
it is all too easy for pilots to simply switch the device on and leave it
alone.
 |
| Storm cell right on the centre line |
For pilots to maximise the information available for decision making
and to enhance their situational awareness, they must manipulate the weather
radar’s controls (tilt, gain, range etc.). The need to scan the most reflective
part of convective activity, to identify where the most intense convection can
be found, cannot always be left to the automatic modes of weather radars.
 |
| Adverse weather detected by airborne radar |
 |
| And this is what was detected |
There are some (unofficial) online resources and videos which can be
used to improve pilots’ knowledge and supplement that found in operators’
literature. Ultimately, responsibility lies with individual pilots to ensure
that they make the most of their on-board radars, know how to use the equipment
installed and understand how to interpret the information presented to them. In
the absence of formal training or recurrent training, this may only be possible
through regular in-flight practice.
Just as important, is understanding the limitations of the fitted
equipment; there are two main issues. Firstly, the low reflectivity of ice
crystals and hail can make weather detection difficult at high altitude. It is
essential to scan the ‘wet’ part of a convective system – which will be found
much lower down – to identify the most active regions. But, it must also be
understood that speckled green returns at high altitude can indicate dangerous
conditions with ice crystals, hail and turbulence. Secondly, appropriate use of
the radar’s range and an appreciation of signal attenuation are vital in
ensuring that pilots do not fly down ‘blind alleys’ or mis-identify ‘hidden’
areas of convection behind other areas of activity. Using this information,
pilots should apply the recommended lateral separation which, depending on
altitude, can be many tens of nautical miles and should, ideally, be upwind.
The future should see enhanced strategic and tactical tools becoming
available to crews via Operational Control and Supervision (OCS) and live
weather data streamed direct to the flight deck.
Finally, if all strategic (flight planning/flight watch) and tactical
(radar/live data/visual) measures fail, pilots may have to resort to mitigating
the effects of adverse weather. We have seen recent incidents of large
transport aircraft suffering Loss of Control In-flight (LOC-I). It is essential
that all pilots are familiar with the required responses. However, as the AF447
accident shows, there is still a place for ‘sitting on our hands’;
notwithstanding the turbulence, when the unreliable airspeed indications first
manifested themselves, simply maintaining the datum pitch attitude and thrust
setting for level flight may have kept the aircraft flying safely until the
checklist allowed the crew to diagnose the problem.
In time, the fidelity of flight simulators will improve and meaningful
upset training should become possible. In the ‘bizjet’ community, some
organisations are already using small, ex-military, swept wing aircraft to train
and refresh upset recoveries. Recently, the FAA mandated recurrent upset
training for commercial pilots and EASA are currently going through a rule
making process to do the same. This will likely require simulator software to
be updated and will take time but, as recent incidents show, the single most
important element in avoiding LOC-I is avoiding or exiting the aerodynamic
stall. In the last few years, the manufacturers of large commercial transport
aircraft have updated their advice and procedures. In terms of the stall, this
is best achieved by prompt, positive action to unload the wing. Furthermore, in
the case of underwing engines, thrust is not used initially due to the pitch
effect and risk of a secondary stall. More generally, current upset recovery
advice should be familiar to all pilots from their basic training. All aircraft
have their own type-specific procedures and characteristics but the essence is
to unload the wings if necessary, roll wings level and recover to level flight;
thrust or power is used as appropriate.
Pilots must have a comprehensive knowledge of radar use, radar
limitations, aircraft performance datums and basic recovery techniques to
ensure safe flight in the dynamic and energetic atmosphere in which we operate.
Operational Control and
Supervision
The accidents involving AF447 and AH5017 flights could have been
averted if European operators were required to comply with vigorous and
vigilant operational control and supervision methodologies.
Other countries and ICAO signatories do have robust systems that are
compliant with national regulations; notable amongst these is the USA with 14 CFR Part 121 and sub-parts E, F, M, N, P, T, U
where the requirements for operational control and supervision is clearly
defined, the high level headings of which are:
- Flight Release (Pre Flight) 121 subpart F
- Flight Following (In-Flight) 121 subpart U
Under these two headings requirements for the safety of a flight are
planned and supervised by qualified people on the ground. This includes, but is
not exhaustive; the assessments of airworthiness, fuel requirements (RCF as
applicable), weather observed and forecast, performance, crew fitness and
avoidance of fatigue, NOTAM and ATM liaison. This oversight augments the safety
of a flight and assists the commander of a flight in his decision making; it
does not override any decision made by the aeroplane commander.
If we look at the case of AF447, active flight watch, of a flight
planned to transit the Inter Tropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ), could have
alerted the crew to an encounter with adverse weather of extreme convectivity
on their planned route, by ground based personnel.
In the case
of AH5017 the departure routing (SID) was changed by the Ouagadougou controller
from the planned Niamey (NY) ROFER, to EPOPO GAO. This routed AH5017 into the
teeth of a mesoscale convective system and though radar was used to guide the
flight around a highly convective storm cell, the proximity of the deviation
was insufficient to avert aerodynamic upset caused by it. Had this flight been
subject to a flight release system the route alteration could not have been
allowed without approval of the operational control centre (Flight Dispatch).
 |
| Courtesy of the BEA AH5017 Interim Report |
In Europe we have no such operational oversight as the FAA system and
no descriptive regulations as to how an operator should comply with an
operational control and supervision requirement for the “Initiation, Continuation,
Termination and Diversion of a flight” see EASA AIR OPS Annex III AMC1 ORO.GEN.110(c)
and then the contradiction to this rule:
GM1 ORO.GEN.110(c) Operator
responsibilities
OPERATIONAL CONTROL
(a) ORO.GEN.110(c) does not
imply a requirement for licensed flight dispatchers or a full flight watch
system.
It is an irony that EASA opinion 01/2014 “Amendment of requirements for flight recorders and underwater locating
devices” concerns the detection of the CVFDR post-crash, yet there is no
concern at the lack of supervision methodologies that could potentially avert
the loss of a flight as well as track the actual position of it, at a minimum
of 15 minute intervals.
AF447 was lost for two years under the South Atlantic Ocean and AH5027
was lost for 23 hours in the Saharan Desert; MH370 is still missing since the 8th
March 2014.
Summary
There have recently been some high profile incidents and accidents in
which adverse weather encounters were or may have been a contributory factor.
For operators and pilots to be able to make sound judgements about the optimum
course of action when faced with severe weather, they need a multi-layered
defence system consisting of strategic (flight planning/flight watch), tactical
(weather radar/live data/ATC) and, as a last resort, physical (visual)
mitigations.
For crews, regular recurrent weather radar training might improve
confidence in using this valuable tool and also situational awareness when
confronted with adverse weather encounters. The radar is far from a ‘turnkey
solution’ and requires an enhanced knowledge about the specific radar and its
use in terms of optimum settings to correctly interrogate and interpret the
weather display. It is also vitally important that the limitations of the radar
are trained and updated as technologies improve. Also placing more emphasis on
traditional pilot handling skills, both in basic training and in recurrent and
initial type conversion, would be of value if a crew were to find themselves
with an in-flight upset following a weather encounter.
Current EU regulations make for lightweight operational control and
supervision. Improved operational oversight, similar to FAR Part 121, is a thorough
means to provide up-to-date weather information, perhaps via the ACARS, which
is of particular relevance for long-haul flights where the weather in-flight
may be significantly different from the planning forecasts. Furthermore, this
method of operational oversight might also be of benefit in the worst-case of a
‘lost’ flight in finding the most likely location to begin a search.
With airspace becoming ever-more-congested it is possible that weather
encounters may increase, in part due to lack of alternative routings. We
consider that greater operational oversight along with enhanced pilot training
may go some way towards mitigating this risk.
Air Safety Group
September 2015
